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Abstract
I use experimental asset markets to analyze trading under di¤erent transparency and
information settings. I nd that both liquidity and informed traders use undisclosed orders
to compete for liquidity provision. In opaque markets, traders increase aggressiveness
to improve execution probability. Without information friction, market opacity enhances
liquidity, especially toward the end of trading, and is benecial for liquidity traders.
Under informed trading, adverse selection drives market outcomes mainly around news
announcements. Monopolistic insiders exploit opacity at the expense of large liquidity
traders. Opacity does not a¤ect informational e¢ ciency with a monopolistic insider, but
value discovery is faster when informational rents are shared.
(JEL classication: C91, C92, G28)
Keywords: Undisclosed orders, hidden liquidity, information asymmetry, market opacity,
insider trading.
1 Introduction
In most modern trading platforms, orders posted to the limit order book (LOB) also include
instructions specifying the degree of disclosure (Cheuvreux, 2012). Such orders, labeled
as undisclosed (reserve or iceberg) orders, allow traders to limit the quantity exposure by
concealing a portion of the order. This feature reduces the pre-trade transparency of the
market, since traders do not observe the total depth available on the electronic LOB. Using
laboratory markets, in this paper I address two related yet unresolved questions regarding
the use of undisclosed orders. The rst question inquires about the source of hidden liquidity
and its impact on the trading strategies of market participants while the second is related
to its implications on di¤erent dimensions of market quality.
Undisclosed orders account for a large proportion of trading activity in major
exchanges, for example, more than 44% of the Euronext volume (Bessembinder, Panayides
and Venkataraman, 2009), about 28% of the Australian Stock Exchange volume (Aitken,
Berkman and Mak, 2001), 16% of executed shares on Xetra (Frey and Sandas, 2008), and
20% of executions in the NASDAQ (Yao, 2013).1 However, the source of hidden liquidity is
still controversial. Two separate viewpoints emerge regarding the types of traders and their
motivation for submitting undisclosed orders. According to the rst view, large liquidity
traders enter markets for exogenous reasons and prefer undisclosed orders to compete with
other liquidity suppliers and/or to protect their orders from fast traders (Buti and Rindi,
2009, 2013). If only large liquidity traders (Harris, 1997) opt for undisclosed orders, then
the implications on market quality are mixed. While opacity improves depth at the top
of the book, it widens the spread at the expense of small traders. On the other hand, in
the second view, informed traders employ hidden liquidity to conceal private information
and to minimize the price impact of large orders. If this is the underlying reason, then
opacity introduced through undisclosed orders could harm the informational e¢ ciency of
1Some exchanges, such as the NASDAQ, the NYSE, and alternative trading platforms, that is, dark pools,
also o¤er completely hidden orders. However, my analysis is limited to partially disclosed orders following
theoretical models on undisclosed orders (Moinas, 2010; Buti and Rindi, 2013).
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nancial markets. While the e¤ect on market quality is positive due to increased trading
volume (Moinas, 2010), this view also highlights the potential role of undisclosed orders as
a tool to obscure insider trading. Boulatov and George (2013) suggest that hidden liquidity
attracts informed traders to liquidity provision, hence improving liquidity and informational
e¢ ciency via intense competition. Overall, even though the stock exchanges are in a race to
o¤er darker platforms, there is still no consensus in the academic literature on the virtues of
concealing orders.
I design an asset market experiment to study market opacity introduced via undisclosed
orders and its sensitivity to market friction induced by private information. I start with a
baseline setting under symmetric information where I rule out the potential e¤ects of adverse
selection on hidden liquidity. I compare an opaque regime with a transparent alternative that
excludes the possibility of undisclosed orders. In a second setting, I introduce a monopolistic
insider in experimental asset markets, maintaining all other features. I also run additional
sessions with two insiders. This design allows competition among informed traders (Boulatov
and George, 2013). I analyze trading mechanisms under both symmetric and asymmetric
information. My results contribute to the recent debate on dark trading and have important
implications for market design.
I document several interesting ndings from the experimental asset markets. My
rst observation is that both liquidity and informed traders compete for liquidity provision
(Boulatov and George, 2013; Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015) and make use of undisclosed
orders. In opaque markets, on average, about 20% of limit orders are replaced by undisclosed
orders. Whenever traders reduce liquidity consumption to control for price risk, they provide
liquidity more aggressively to increase execution probability, which in turn a¤ects market
liquidity. Both large liquidity and informed traders submit, on average, more undisclosed
orders compared to other trader types, but there is substantial heterogeneity among informed
traders: They either submit no undisclosed orders at all (nearly half of informed traders)
or supply hidden liquidity in large quantities and at price levels further away from the
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midquote. Nonetheless, informed traders manage to pool with large liquidity traders in
liquidity provision, exploit their informational advantage, and thus a¤ect market outcomes.
Second, I show that large liquidity traders obtain higher trading prots in opaque
markets under symmetric information, since liquidity consumption is cheaper. Once a
monopolistic insider is introduced to the market, however, large liquidity traders are
negatively a¤ected by reduced transparency, because monopolistic insiders are better at
extracting informational rents. In other words, under an opaque regime, a monopolistic
insider is better o¤ at the expense of large liquidity traders. However, once informational
rents are shared by two insiders, then market transparency has a minor e¤ect on the prots
of liquidity traders. These results suggest that any welfare analysis of market transparency
should control for the degree of adverse selection in the market.
Third, without an insider, reducing transparency contributes positively to market
liquidity, especially toward the end of the trading period. Liquidity traders substitute part of
the limit and marketable orders with undisclosed orders to reduce exposure to opportunistic
traders and price risk but, at the same time, they increase limit order aggressiveness to
compensate for the reduction in execution probability. This strategic behavior reduces both
quoted bid-ask and realized spreads, that is, the temporary price impact of marketable orders.
Under asymmetric information, however, the spread does not change overall under di¤erent
transparency regimes. One exception is around public news announcements: Thanks to
market opacity, informed traders do not have to rush to exploit their informational advantage
and can a¤ord to trade using less aggressive orders, that is, limit or undisclosed orders
instead of marketable orders, but, to increase the execution probability, they submit liquidity
more aggressively, which reduces quoted spreads immediately after information release.
Increasing the degree of adverse selection with more insiders results in increased book depth
in opaque markets without a¤ecting quoted spreads, in line with empirical evidence from the
Toronto Stock Exchange (Anand and Weaver, 2004). In the case of a monopolistic insider,
transparency does not a¤ect the informational e¢ ciency of asset markets, but value discovery
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is faster in opaque markets when informational rents are shared between insiders (Boulatov
and George, 2013). Bloomeld, OHara and Saar (BOS, 2015) also nd that the depth
dimension of liquidity improves due to opacity, but the authors do not document any e¤ect
on informational e¢ ciency. However, their study has several di¤erences in experimental
design from mine, particularly regarding the quality of the private information held by
informed traders.
There are few theoretical papers on hidden liquidity. My market design is closely linked
to a paper by Buti and Rindi (2013), who study optimal order strategies in a dynamic
LOB allowing undisclosed orders. In their model, risk-neutral traders make simultaneous
strategic decisions on price, quantity, and exposure conditional on the state of the LOB
and their private valuations of assets. Buti and Rindis model extends the models of both
Foucault (1999) and Parlour (1998), who abstract from private information. In equilibrium,
large traders submit hidden liquidity to electronic LOB for two di¤erent motivations: to
avoid competition for liquidity provision and/or to avoid being picked o¤ by fast traders in
case of a public information shock (Buti and Rindi, 2009). The former refers to a situation
where a competitor undercuts a large limit buy (sell) order by sending a limit buy (sell)
order at a slightly higher (lower) price (typically by the minimum tick size), thus gaining
price priority. Undisclosed orders help prevent undercutting by hiding order quantity. In the
latter case, supplying hidden liquidity would complicate the detection of mispriced orders
(e.g., due to new information arrival) that are likely to be exploited by scalpers. In one of the
earliest studies, Aitken, Berkman and Mak (2001) analyze the Australian Stock Exchange
and conclude that uninformed liquidity suppliers use hidden quantity to reduce the option
value of their limit orders (Copeland and Galai, 1983) and thus protect themselves from
parasitic traders. Bessembinder, Panayides and Venkataraman (2009) and Pardo Tornero
and Pascual (2011) show that traders use undisclosed orders to manage exposure and pick
o¤ risk. De Winne and DHondt, (2007) and Frey and Sandas (2008) fail to nd any impact
of private information on hidden liquidity provision.
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Moinas (2010) proposes the rst theoretical model with private information to analyze
the e¤ect of undisclosed orders on market performance and trader welfare. She builds a
discrete sequential model of trading with incomplete information and concludes that hidden
liquidity is part of the informed (insider) agents equilibrium camouage strategy. That
analysis supports the idea that undisclosed orders are driven by informational concerns, that
is, not revealing private information to the market through large orders that are likely to
have a price impact. In a di¤erent setting, Boulatov and George (2013) also focus on hidden
liquidity provision under asymmetric information. They predict that informed traders are
more inclined to provide liquidity in opaque markets. Moinas (2010) and Boulatov and
George (2013) suggest improved liquidity through reduced pre-trade transparency. Anand
andWeaver (2004) show that informed traders use hidden liquidity to minimize price impacts
if trading activity is high using data from the Toronto Stock Exchange. Belter (2007) and
Kumar, Thirumalai and Yadav (2009) also provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that
the use of undisclosed orders may be information driven.
Overall, the literature on undisclosed orders is far from conclusive. Given the
controversy, experimental asset markets (e.g., Bloomeld and OHara, 1999; BOS, 2005,
2009, 2015; Perotti and Rindi, 2006) are instrumental when testing the main theoretical
predictions on hidden liquidity, which is not always possible with empirical data. This paper
is one of the rst that attempts to ll this gap.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I summarize the key theoretical predictions
on undisclosed orders. In Section 3, I describe the experimental design. In Section 4, I present
the statistical analysis and the ndings. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Predictions on undisclosed orders
Before I describe the details of my experimental design, I briey revisit the key predictions
recent theories provide on the source of undisclosed orders and the impact of opacity on
5
market quality.
Prediction 1: Liquidity traders submit undisclosed orders to reduce the price impact of large
orders (Esser and Mönch, 2007).
Submitting an undisclosed order with a xed peak size is a dominant order-splitting
strategy as opposed to one splitting large limit orders because, given the time priority rule
in the market, the visible part of the undisclosed order is automatically executed. If this is
the underlying reason for hidden liquidity, I do not expect a signicant change in market
liquidity.
Prediction 2: Liquidity traders submit undisclosed orders to avoid undercutting by other
traders and to compete for liquidity provision (Buti and Rindi, 2013).
If undisclosed orders are used to decrease price competition, the bid-ask spread widens
because orders at the best prices are not subject to undercutting and submission of
undisclosed orders to the second level of the book becomes optimal. While the depth at
the top of the LOB increases, wider spreads reduce the surplus of marketable orders, which
in turn reduces trading volume. Moreover, protection from undercutting results in higher
trading prots for liquidity traders, especially when the tick size is large.
Prediction 3: Informed traders contribute to market liquidity in opaque markets (Moinas,
2010). In the case of more than one informed trader, insiders compete for (hidden) liquidity
provision (Boulatov and George, 2013).
Informed liquidity suppliers often try to imitate the behavior of large liquidity traders
to conceal their private information, and thanks to undisclosed orders, they can enjoy the
informational advantage longer. According to Moinass (2010) model, both informed and
large liquidity suppliers benet from opacity through an increase in depth and trading
volume, but the author makes no prediction on spreads. However, one limitation of the
model is that insiders can only supply liquidity and cannot take advantage of aggressive
marketable orders. Boulatov and George (2013) conjecture that opacity through undisclosed
orders attracts informed traders to supply liquidity and the competition among insiders leads
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to lower bid-ask spreads and more informationally e¢ cient midquotes.
3 The experiment
The design of my asset market experiment takes into account recent theories on
undisclosed orders and focuses on three dimensions: trader types, transparency, and
information asymmetry. In a within-subject design, I control for three trader types and
two transparency regimes. In the baseline setting, I test the e¤ects of market opacity on
both trading strategies and market quality under symmetric information. The analysis is
extended by introducing informed trading. In this setting, there is an additional trader
type, that is, an informed trader, which allows me to compare the transparency regimes
under asymmetric information. Thus, using adverse selection, this experiment is used to
separate market friction from pre-trade transparency.
Under symmetric information, trading is isolated from motives related to private
information. The information structure is common knowledge; hence, there is no
informational advantage across traders. In this setting, one should observe hidden liquidity as
part of an order-splitting strategy (Esser and Mönch, 2007), due to competition for liquidity
provision (Buti and Rindi, 2013) and/or protection from fast traders after public information
release (Buti and Rindi, 2009). Under asymmetric information, adverse selection arises via
a single insider with superior information. This setup is closer to the environment envisaged
by Moinass (2010) theory, which suggests informational concerns behind hidden liquidity. I
refer to Moinass model to convey the intuition in an environment with an informed trader.
To test the sensitivity of the results to a single monopolistic insider, I run additional sessions
with two informed traders, which allows competition among insiders (Boulatov and George,
2013).
7
3.1 Experimental asset markets
In this section, I describe the experimental design in detail and introduce main
parameters of experimental markets (see online Appendix A for instructions). An
experimental asset market is dened as a six-minute trading period. Traders in cohorts
of six to eight traders attend a session under a particular treatment that consists of a
series of experimental markets called replications. I introduce within-subject transparency
manipulation: In all sessions, traders attend markets both under a transparent regime
(three to four replications), with no undisclosed order option, and an opaque regime (three
to four replications), with an undisclosed order option. The transparency treatment order is
randomized; some cohorts start trading in transparent markets and others start in opaque
markets. The market regime is explicitly announced before each trading period.
In each market, one asset is chosen from the distribution shown in Table 1. At the
beginning of each trading period, the expected value of all securities is $45 (experimental
currency). In line with previous studies (e.g., BOS, 2005), the minimum tick size is xed
at $1 in all experimental asset markets. Trading starts with an empty book. Traders are
endowed with di¤erent amounts of cash and a number of securities, depending on the trader
type, explained in the section below, but the expected values of the initial endowment of each
trader type are the same. Cash and shares of the asset are given as a grant. In other words,
the initial endowment is not subtracted from the nal cash balances. This design allows no
trading as a viable trading strategy. Unlike a dealership market, traders are not required to
submit two-sided quotes. They can simply choose to provide or consume liquidity by taking
one side of the trades. This feature reects the electronic LOB mechanism common to many
modern trading venues, such as Euronext.
3.1.1 Information structure
There are three states in the world fL;M;Hg: A single asset has either a high, middle,
or low level of liquidation satisfying the following condition: M L 6= H M . Ex ante, each
8
state is equally likely. A three-state design is used to simplify the already complicated trading
mechanism (Plott and Sunder, 1988). The distribution of liquidation value is common
knowledge to all traders and known before trading starts. One novel feature of my design
is that an information event occurs in the middle of the trading period.2 The experimenter
releases the public information on the fundamental value of the security; the average value





The information event changes the expected fundamental value of the asset. Initially, six
realizations are possible, which reduces to three equally likely outcomes once the information
event occurs. The information event exogenously widens the bid-ask spread during the
trading period and renders some of the outstanding limit orders obsolete. Thus I test how
traders adjust their strategies to changing market conditions under di¤erent transparency
regimes and information settings.
3.1.2 Trading mechanism and the LOB
The trading mechanism is exactly the same under all treatments. Traders attend
markets under both transparent and opaque regimes in a random order. In transparent
markets, traders can post limit orders specifying the price, p 2 f1; ::; 90g ; and the quantity,
q 2 f1; 2; :::9; 10g. Traders can submit block trades all at once, up to 10 shares. The
submission of di¤erent order sizes is important in studying competition for liquidity provision
(Easley and OHara, 1987; Buti and Rindi, 2009, 2013). Traders can also submit marketable
orders stating only the quantity that hits the outstanding limit orders. Marketable orders
above (below) the best ask (bid) are completely executed at di¤erent prices, given enough
2Even though the exact timing of the event is known to the market participants, the order revision cost,
that is, the cost of canceling orders, di¤ers across trader types, which still allows one to pick o¤ stale orders.
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depth at those price levels. However, a marketable order at or inside the best bid o¤er
(BBO) does not walk up the book; that is, if the order quantity is greater than the quantity
at the best limit ask (bid), the remaining quantity after execution remains on the same side
of the book. This feature is similar to that of Euronext Paris. Limit orders reduce the price
risk at the expense of execution probability, while marketable orders facilitate execution,
introducing price risk. In these markets, rst price and then time priority rules apply: orders
that improve trading price, that is, buy (sell) orders submitted at higher (lower) prices, are
executed rst, regardless of arrival time, and if several orders are posted at the same price
level, those that arrive rst are executed rst.
In opaque markets, traders can limit the quantity exposure by posting undisclosed
orders, that is, they can choose to hide their orders, but a predened portion of the order
(peak size = 1) remains visible in the LOB. My design does not capture the trade-o¤between
the optimal limit and the peak size of an undisclosed order, which is the focus of a continuous
time model proposed by Esser and Mönch (2007). In opaque markets, rst price and then
visibility and nally time priority rules apply. Orders that improve trading price, that is,
buy (sell) orders at higher (lower) prices, are executed rst, regardless of arrival time, and
if several orders are posted at the same price level, those that are visible are executed rst,
while the hidden part of undisclosed orders loses time priority against visible limit orders
that arrive later in the book. The visible part of the undisclosed orders, which is equal to
the peak size, does not lose time priority against other limit orders posted at the same price.
Every time the visible part is executed, another unit equal to the peak size becomes visible,
until the entire order is executed (see the example in online Appendix B).
In both markets, orders can be canceled any time during the trading period. All price
levels are shown on the screen. All bids and ask prices are integers; hence, the tick size is one
unit of experimental currency (BOS, 2005).3 I impose short sale restrictions and bankruptcy
conditions. However, traders are endowed with enough cash and securities and, hence, these
3Empirical evidence on the e¤ects of relative tick size is mixed (OHara, Saar and Zhong, 2014). Online
Appendix C shows whether the relative tick size has an impact on hidden liquidity submission.
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conditions are rarely binding.4
3.1.3 Trader types
In each market, traders are randomly assigned to a trader type. Under symmetric
information, there are three di¤erent types: traders with no exogenous trading motives,
which I label uninformed, and traders with either small or large trading targets, that is,
small and large liquidity traders (BOS, 2005, 2009). Unlike previous studies, trading targets
are imposed per two-minute cycles, so there are three trading cycles in each market. Trading
cycles over relatively long periods avoid situations in which traders immediately fulll their
targets and behave randomly. Small liquidity traders should either buy or sell eight shares per
cycle. For large liquidity traders, the target is 20 shares per two-minute cycle. There are equal
numbers of buy and sell targets. This symmetric design implies a zero aggregate net demand.
The direction of the targets  buy or sell remains the same during the six-minute trading
periods. All traders are allowed to buy or sell, regardless of their targets, but liquidity traders
are subject to a large penalty, $1,000 per unfullled target. The penalty is subtracted from
the end-of-period payo¤s.5 I thus introduce heterogeneity among uninformed traders using
trading obligations (Bloomeld and OHara, 1999; BOS, 2005). Liquidity traders transact
for exogenous reasons related to the need to invest or to liquidate positions. Moreover,
having liquidity traders with di¤erent trading obligations helps me test the e¤ect of trading
aggressiveness on market outcomes (Foucault, Kadan and Kandel, 2005).
Each trader starts trading with an initial endowment. The ex ante expected value of
the initial endowments is $7,375 for all trader types. Uninformed traders start with $4,000
and 75 shares. Since these traders are given cash and shares as a grant, they do not have
exogenous reasons to trade. The initial endowment composition of liquidity traders depends
on the direction and magnitude of their targets. For example, traders with buy targets start
4Short-sale constraints are binding only for 3% of liquidity traders.
5I do not allow for the partial fulllment of trading targets; the same penalty applies even if traders
miss their targets by one share. Given the price grid, fullling the target is a dominant strategy (see online
Appendix D).
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with more cash and fewer shares (see Table 2).
In asymmetric information sessions, a monopolistic insider replaces one uninformed
trader. The new trader type starts with the same initial endowment as the uninformed
trader and has no trading obligation. On top of the dividend distribution, the monopolistic
insider knows the true state of the world before each market starts. This gives the trader
an informational advantage until the public information release when the trader learns the
true value of the liquidating dividend. Adverse selection via a single informed trader allows
me to investigate how the participation of an insider (Kyle, 1985; Collin-Dufresne and Fos,
2015) a¤ects liquidity dynamics and trading strategies under di¤erent transparency regimes.6
In further sessions, I analyze trading once there is competition among informed traders
(Boulatov and George, 2013).
3.2 Participants and incentives
I run sessions with di¤erent incentive schemes. I rst conduct paid pilot sessions with 24
Tilburg University students recruited through the CentER experimental laboratory. Pilot
sessions lasted two and a half hours and the participants were paid on average e10 per
hour. Questionnaires after the rst pilot sessions revealed that participants had di¢ culty
understanding the trading mechanism using undisclosed orders. Moreover, in these pilot
sessions, the participants did not have enough training to develop trading strategies. To
overcome this problem, I designed a longitudinal study with students who had a basic
knowledge of the functioning of security exchanges.7
I ran the next sessions at Bocconi University with undergraduate students (N = 72,
11 cohorts) who attended a series of sessions as part of a market microstructure course
requirement in 2009 (N = 31, ve cohorts) and 2011 (N = 41, six cohorts). In 2009, I
6Insider trading is illegal in many countries, but in some countries such as in the United States, legal
insider trading is allowed under strict ling requirements, such as SEC Form 4 or Schedule 13D ling
(Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015) .
7I ran another two-month pilot study with PhD students (N = 6) who followed a market microstructure
course. Their performance in the trading experiment determined 15% of their course grade.
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presented the experiment as an opportunity to increase ones course grade by one to three
points (up to 20%), based on trading performance. A total of 31 students committed
themselves to attend a series of sessions for a month. The use of ones course grade
as an incentive scheme is controversial in experimental economics and nance; however,
given the longitudinal nature of the experiment, grades provide a good scheme to guarantee
commitment for an extended period. Moreover, this incentive mechanism has the advantage
of introducing the possibility of loss, that is, obtaining no points after attending one month
of trading sessions (Kroll and Levy, 1992). In 2011, I repeated the same experiment, but this
time introducing an average payment of e12.5 per hour on top of the course grade incentive.
I report the aggregate results of both experiments below.8
Participants rst attended a lab session for the presentation of instructions and trading
rules. The training session lasted 90 minutes and participants had extensive interactive
training with the trading interface. They attended a second online training session to improve
their familiarity with the trading rules and to develop trading strategies. In the last three
online sessions, participants traded under three di¤erent settings, that is, under symmetric
information, asymmetric information, and either with auctions for private information (2009)
or under asymmetric information with multiple insiders (2011).9 In each session, participants
are randomly assigned to a di¤erent cohort, but against traders with the same experience
level.
All participants start with some cash and a security endowment as explained above and
the interest rate is zero. Trading gains from one period are not transferred to other periods
but are recorded to calculate cumulative payo¤s. Participantsearnings in each market are
the liquidation value of the assets they hold at the end of the trading period plus the capital
gains (losses) obtained through trading assets minus the xed penalty for not fullling each
trading target. All price and values are denominated in the laboratory currency. In the
8Separate analyses of the data reveal that the lack of monetary incentives did not change the participants
behavior in such a way that would impair our inferences (results available upon request).
9I discuss the results on auctions for private information in online Appendix E.
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training sessions, I provided the participants with the explicit formula used to compute the
payo¤s. This ensured that they unambiguously understood the incentives and how they
related to trading. Participantsgrades and monetary payo¤s depended on their cumulative
performance in all trading (except training) sessions.
4 Results
The statistical analysis is conducted at both the market and individual subject levels.
Each of the eleven cohorts is a single independent data point averaged over di¤erent
replications under the same market design, that is, opaque versus transparent. At the market
level, I compare the within-cohort di¤erences of market quality measures (within-subjects
design). I report the Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values for the paired samples. At the individual
level, for each participant, dependent variables are aggregated under a relevant cell, that is,
trader typetransparency, and the trading strategies of the same participant are compared
under di¤erent trading roles. This design allows me to control for individual di¤erences
across participants. The results of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) are used to determine
the e¤ects of market structure on trading prots under di¤erent information settings.
To calculate market quality measures, an algorithm merges orders from the LOB with
transaction data from the transaction book. All submitted limit, marketable, and undisclosed
orders are collected on a tick-by-tick basis. I reconstruct the LOB for outstanding orders and
obtain snapshots of the LOB for each second, which permits calculation of all depth-related
measures at all price levels of the electronic order book.
I compute liquidity, depth, and volatility measures separately to assess the impact of
market transparency and informational friction on market quality. As a liquidity measure,
I proxy for message tra¢ c using the total number of limit and marketable orders (and
undisclosed orders under an opaque regime) submitted to the LOB. I also report the total
transacted volume in shares and the number of shares per trade. The quoted bid-ask spread
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and e¤ective spread reect implicit transaction costs and the price impact of marketable
orders. The latter is measured by Pt Mt (Mt Pt) for a buy (sell) order, where Pt and Mt
are the transaction price and the midquote (BOS, 2009). I decompose the e¤ective spread
into temporary and permanent price impacts. The former is also known as the realized spread
and is measured by the distance between the transaction price and the midquote prevailing
after ve trades, while the latter is the di¤erence between the midquote and the midquote
prevailing after ve trades. The (visible) depth is the total number of (visible) shares both
at the BBO and at all price levels of the LOB, labeled book depth. Finally, volatility is the
sample estimate of the standard deviation of prices using both the transaction price and the
midquote.
4.1 Overview: order types
Figure 1 exhibits the time evolution of submitted shares of di¤erent order types under
symmetric (Panel A) and asymmetric information (Panel B). The data are aggregated over
30-second intervals across di¤erent replications and cohorts.
Since trading starts with an empty book, there is a large accumulation of limit orders at
the beginning of each market. Limit shares show a downward trend during the trading period,
exhibiting cyclical spikes coinciding with trading targets. Marketable orders, on the other
hand, do not show any trend during the trading period. However, both limit and marketable
shares move together around trading cycles, that is, at the second and fourth minutes,
reecting both exogenous trading targets and endogenous reactions to trading opportunities
(Foucault, Kadan and Kandel, 2005, 2013). Liquidity provision decreases just before a public
information release. This reduction is similar to the evidence on anticipated news in equity
(e.g., Graham, Koski and Loewenstein, 2006; So and Wang, 2014) and bond markets (e.g.,
Green, 2004; Engle et al., 2012). The sudden spike in marketable orders after a public
information release shows that traders respond very rapidly to news and adjust to new
fundamentals. The features are common under both symmetric and asymmetric information.
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Undisclosed orders exhibit a downward sloping pattern, which is consistent with the fact
that they lose time priority in execution. At the beginning of the trading period, when the
book builds, spreads are typically larger, with higher price volatility, and this is when I expect
to see more extensive use of undisclosed orders (Bessembinder, Panayides and Venkataraman,
2009). Traders are also more likely to submit undisclosed orders before public information
release to avoid the risk of picking o¤ stale orders, but the use of undisclosed orders should
increase as the time to news announcement decreases (Buti and Rindi, 2009).10 In Panel A
of Figure 2, I compare the number of undisclosed orders submitted in the rst and second
halves of trading. The number decreases, on average, from 45 shares to 23 shares (p-value
< .000) under symmetric information and from 55 shares to 34 shares (p-value < .000)
under asymmetric information. However, when I compare undisclosed orders right before
and after an information release, the decrease is less pronounced. An increase in undisclosed
orders under asymmetric information that persists through the last trading cycle hints at
informational motives behind hidden liquidity provision (Chakrabarty and Shaw, 2008). To
explore this notion further, I analyze trading strategies in Section 4.2.
Panel B in Figure 2 shows the percentage of executed volume that consists of undisclosed
orders. The gure reveals that 17.8% to 19.5% of the executed volume in the experimental
asset markets is undisclosed, which is similar to the evidence documented in empirical studies
(e.g., Frey and Sandas, 2008; Yao, 2013). While the ex ante probability of execution is lower
for undisclosed orders, it seems that undisclosed orders are submitted aggressively to the
LOB and more so under symmetric information (Frey and Sandas, 2008; Hasbrouck and
Saar, 2009).
4.2 Trading strategies
In Table 3, I report the average number of shares of limit, marketable, and undisclosed
orders submitted by each trader type under symmetric information. The focus is on
10On the contrary, Jiang, Lo and Verdelhan (2011) document the withdrawal of hidden depth before news
announcement in U.S. Treasury bond markets.
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competition for liquidity provision and trader aggressiveness. I report four di¤erent measures:
i) the number of limit orders submitted inside the bid-ask spread that improves the best price,
ii) the number of limit orders submitted at the BBO, iii) the average distance of limit orders to
the prevailing midquote, and iv) the average distance of undisclosed orders to the prevailing
midquote conditional on submission (Bessembinder, Panayides and Venkataraman, 2009).
In my asset markets, exogenous trading targets constrain liquidity tradersbehavior.
In principle, liquidity traders should be more active in trading by participating not only in
liquidity demand but also in liquidity provision. This is what I observe in Table 3 under
both transparent and opaque regimes. Since liquidity traders, especially large ones, have
exogenous trading motives, they also trade faster and provide liquidity more aggressively at
the top levels of the book. The di¤erence between transparent and opaque regimes is that
traders also have the option to provide liquidity using undisclosed orders. Large liquidity
traders use this option and shift about 20% of liquidity supply to undisclosed orders. It seems
that they follow a mixed strategy of using both limit and undisclosed orders for liquidity
provision, together with marketable orders to satify their liquidity needs and guarantee
execution. Undisclosed orders allow liquidity traders to reduce order exposure and to control
price risk and therefore complement both limit and marketable orders. However, at the same
time, they reduce the execution probability due to the visibility priority rule. Large liquidity
traders act strategically and improve execution probability by submitting limit orders more
aggressively, rather than demanding more liquidity through marketable orders.
Traditionally, informed traders are associated with short-lived information and are hence
perceived as impatient traders who would like to exploit informational advantages as quickly
as possible by consuming liquidity. However, researchers (BOS, 2005; Kaniel and Liu,
2006; Rindi, 2008; Boulatov and George, 2013) suggest that informed traders contribute
substantially to liquidity provision, particularly when the information is su¢ ciently
persistent. If used strategically, undisclosed orders may increase the life of private
information by concealing trading motives (Moinas, 2010). The results reported in Table 4
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under asymmetric information suggest that informed traders indeed act strategically and pool
with large liquidity traders in both liquidity provision and consumption under a transparent
regime. In terms of submitted shares, I do not observe signicant di¤erences between large
liquidity and informed traders. In other words, informed traders are as active as large
liquidity traders in liquidity provision (Menkho¤, Osler and Schmeling, 2010). This evidence
suggests erce competition, that is, a race to trade (Boulatov and George, 2013) between
two trader types for liquidity provision. Notably, under an opaque regime, informed traders
are less active in liquidity provision through visible limit orders and act less aggressively:
They submit fewer limit orders that improve prices (inside spread) so that they can exploit
their informational advantage as long as possible. They also exploit undisclosed orders to
provide liquidity. However, I observe substantial heterogeneity among insiders (e.g., Cohen,
Malloy and Pomorski, 2012), and some informed traders do not use undisclosed orders at
all. Once submitted, however, informed traders use undisclosed orders in larger quantities,
further from the prevailing midquote.
4.3 Trading prots
The general conclusion that can be drawn from current models is that opacity via
undisclosed orders improves the welfare of the market participants. In the absence of
informed traders, Buti and Rindi (2013) predict that liquidity traders, especially large ones,
benet from opaque markets. Models under adverse selection (Moinas, 2010; Boulatov and
George, 2013) make a similar prediction for both informed and uninformed traders.
I measure trading prots at the individual subject level for each trader type and compute
prots as the nal payo¤ net of the initial endowment.11 Panel A in Figure 3 exhibits
the trading prots in markets under symmetric information and compares prots across
transparent and opaque regimes. Liquidity traders, especially large ones, are better o¤ in
11I elicit tradersrisk preferences following Holt and Laurys (2002) procedure. The average number of
safe choices (n=69) is 4.74, which suggests slightly risk-averse behavior. Therefore, I believe that trading
prot is a good approximation for measuring subjectsutility.
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opaque markets at the expense of uninformed traders. The increase in trading prots for
large liquidity traders is in line with Buti and Rindis (2013) prediction, but the mechanism
generating di¤erences in prots seems to be di¤erent. In online Appendix F.1, I decompose
the trading prots into "make and take" prots, that is, prots through limit orders versus
marketable orders, respectively. I see that market making for uninformed traders is less
protable under an opaque regime, which leads to the di¤erence in total prots across
the two transparency regimes. On the other hand, large liquidity traders su¤er losses,
on average, through limit orders under both transparent and opaque regimes. While the
make losses are more pronounced under an opaque regime, liquidity consumption is more
protable. Di¤erences in trading prots across transparency regimes are likely to arise due
to di¤erences in implicit transaction costs across regimes. Therefore, in the next section, I
compare di¤erent measures of liquidity across transparency regimes.
As a formal analysis, I run an ANOVA to test the e¤ects of market design on trading
prots under symmetric information. The dependent variable is the traders payo¤ relative
to the average market payo¤ normalized by the unconditional expected payo¤ ($7,375). The
independent variables include trader type  uninformed, small liquidity (buy/sell), large
liquidity (buy/sell) , opacity (transparent vs. opaque), and extremity (whether the state is
extreme or not), and four interaction terms. An asset is classied as extreme if the liquidating
dividend is more than 20% from the unconditional mean (BOS, 2005). The results are shown
in Table 5. Neither trader type nor market opacity alone a¤ects trader prots. It is also
not surprising that the extremity variable is not signicant, since none of the traders have
superior information in these markets. The only signicant variable is the interaction term,
typeopacity, suggesting that market opacity has di¤erent implications for di¤erent trader
types, consistent with the evidence above.
I repeat the same analysis under asymmetric information. Panel B in Figure 3 shows
that informed traders, on average, earn more than the other trader types. This result is
expected, since in my experimental markets informed traders have a clear informational
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advantage and they seem to be able to extract an informational rent. Interestingly
though, they are, on average, better o¤ under an opaque regime at the expense of
large liquidity traders. The decomposition in online Appendix Table F.2 also shows that
opacity adversely a¤ects both the make and take prots of large liquidity traders. Hence,
unlike markets under symmetric information, once information friction is introduced, large
liquidity traders are worse o¤ due to reduced transparency, which is in contrast with
Moinass (2010) prediction. The ANOVA results in Table 6 indicate that trader type,
particularly an informed one, clearly a¤ects trading prots under asymmetric information.
The signicant interaction term typeextremity shows that a monopolistic insider can
better exploit his or her informational advantage, especially when the information is more
valuable.
4.4 Market quality
An important regulatory concern is how a reduction in pre-trade transparency of the
nancial markets a¤ects market quality (e.g., Madhavan, Porter and Weaver, 2005; Foucault,
Pagano and Röell, 2010; Gozluklu, 2013). In light of the theoretical predictions summarized
in Section 2, I now turn to the analysis of changes in market quality due to pre-trade opacity
introduced via undisclosed orders. Market quality is measured along di¤erent dimensions,
that is, liquidity, depth, and volatility, as dened in Section 4.
Table 7 reports both the mean and median values of di¤erent market quality measures
under transparent and opaque regimes and symmetric information. Trading activity and
volatility measures are not sensitive to market transparency. Book depth, on average, is
higher (yet not signicant) in opaque markets, while visible book depth is lower, reecting
the reduction in market transparency. The average trade size is similar across transparency
regimes, suggesting that order splitting cannot be the main motive (Prediction 1) behind
hidden liquidity. The main change induced by opacity is the reduction of quoted spreads
(by almost a quarter tick, on average) and, in particular, the realized spread, capturing
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the temporary price impact of marketable orders (p-value=0.087). Improved liquidity is
broadly in line with the increased market participation of liquidity traders with undisclosed
orders to avoid the risk of being picked o¤. However, the risk of being picked o¤ cannot
alone explain the reduction in spreads. First, traders have other means of avoiding exposure
risk, via order cancellation. Second, there is no signicant increase in undisclosed orders
before information release. Finally, online Appendix Table G.1 also shows the displayed and
undisclosed ll rates of submitted orders for both the entire trading period and one minute
after information release. While the ll rates are lower for displayed orders for the entire
trading period, I do not observe a signicant decrease in ll rates right after information
release.
A reduction in spreads is in contrast with Prediction 2, which suggests an increase in
spreads due to price competition via undisclosed orders. Given the balanced nature of the
trading targets, that is, equal numbers of buy and sell targets, liquidity traders in these
markets coordinate to satify their liquidity needs rather than compete; hence, there is no
increase in the bid-ask spread as predicted by Buti and Rindi (2013). Further inspection into
the dynamic evolution of liquidity shows that the reduction in spreads in opaque markets
is mainly concentrated around the deadlines of trading targets, especially at the end of the
trading period (p-value=0.005). In the next section, I analyze dynamic trading strategies to
see how they a¤ect aggregate market outcomes.
Under asymmetric information, most of the market outcomes are insensitive to the
transparency regime (see Table 8). Only the average trade size decreases signicantly
(p-value= 0.087), reecting the participation of both liquidity and informed traders in
hidden liquidity provision. Since both large liquidity and informed traders join the race
for liquidity provision, there is an increase in book depth (Prediction 3), but this result is
only statistically signicant when there is more than one informed trader (discussed later
in Section 4.6). Importantly, I do not detect a decrease in spreads, either in quoted or
in the realized spreads, over the entire trading period, except the period around a public
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information announcement. Spreads around the information event are lower, on average,
by more than one tick under an opaque regime. This is the period when liquidity traders
are exposed to more adverse selection risk. The ll rates in online Appendix Table G.2
show that uninformed and liquidity traders exploit undisclosed orders to protect themselves
against adverse selection. On the other hand, the monopolistic insider can exploit the
informational rent longer in opaque markets, thanks to the undisclosed orders. Rather than
acting aggressively using marketable orders to benet from the informational advantage, the
insider can pool with liquidity traders and provide liquidity more aggressively. The insider
can thus increase the execution probability without revealing private information. I can
thereby observe the reduction in spreads around the release of public information. Overall,
the results indicate that informational friction is an important dimension in the transparency
debate.12
4.5 From trading to market outcomes
Unlike the experimental evidence provided by BOS (2015), I observe not only the
sensitivity of trading strategies to transparency regimes, but also that some of the market
outcomes are driven by both the transparency regime and informational friction. However,
it is important to highlight the di¤erences in experimental design between the BOS (2015)
study and mine. First, the composition of traders is not the same: BOSs (2015) design
includes only two types of traders: liquidity and informed. Second, the information structure
is di¤erent. In BOSs (2015) experiment, the informed traders participate in all markets,
hence there is no symmetric information setting. Third, informed traders are not insiders
but receive an imprecise signal about the fundamental value of the asset. Last but not least,
in BOSs (2015) study markets are open for three minutes, without a public information
release in the middle of trading.
To see how aggregate trading a¤ects market outcomes, I report liquidity make and
12In online Appendix H, I show that how insider trading increases adverse selection costs, that is, an
increase in volatility and bid-ask spread, regardless of the transparency regime.
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take measures that reect the aggregate order choice. Liquidity make is proxied by the
submission rate, which is the sum of submitted limit orders (and undisclosed orders in
opaque markets) over total orders. The take rate, on the other hand, is the sum of submitted
marketable orders over limit orders (and undisclosed orders in opaque markets). Limit order
aggressiveness captures the impatience of the average market participant (Foucault, Kadan
and Kandel, 2005). It is measured by the average distance between the limit order price and
the prevailing midquote at the time of order submission. While aggressive liquidity provision
reduces spreads, liquidity consumption has the opposite e¤ect on market liquidity.
In Figure 4, I compare order submission strategies in transparent and opaque markets
under symmetric information over one-minute time intervals. The vertical line indicates the
time of the public information release about the nal dividend distribution. The submission
rates are very similar across transparency regimes. The signicant reduction in spreads
toward the end of two-minute cycles in opaque markets (see Table 7) coincides with the
period when traders supply liquidity more aggressively rather than switch to marketable
orders. There is a reduction in spreads when traders try to increase the execution probability
of limit orders by submission to the top of the book. Right after information release, the
mispricing of stale orders is corrected. In opaque markets, due to the greater accumulation
of limit orders before the announcement, limit orders are submitted less aggressively after
the information release, but more orders are picked o¤ with marketable orders. The overall
e¤ect is a larger (but insignicant) spread in opaque markets right after the release of public
information. This implies that, in the absence of information asymmetry, opacity a¤ects
market outcomes mainly through the strategic choice of order aggressiveness. Dynamic
strategies reect the trade-o¤ between waiting costs and the cost of immediacy, that is,
bid-ask spreads, and conrm the intuition that mainly aggressive limit orders drive the
evolution of spreads (Foucault, Kadan and Kandel, 2005).
Figure 5 shows dynamic order submission strategies in transparent and opaque markets
under asymmetric information. It also separately shows the strategies of informed traders
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(lines with star symbols). First, I see that informed traders act di¤erently from all the
other market participants: They are very active in liquidity provision, especially around the
information event, but they do not necessarily supply liquidity aggressively. Monopolistic
insiders also engage heavily in liquidity consumption right after the information release to
exploit their informational advantage, but they manage to pool with large liquidity traders
and increase the execution probability of their informed orders by submitting more aggressive
limit orders in opaque markets, rather than exploiting marketable orders. Hence, there
is a signicant decrease in bid-ask spreads after the release of public information under
asymmetric information.13
Outstanding limit orders can also be revised through order cancellation. Figure 6 shows
cancel-to-make rate under symmetric and asymmetric information. The gure shows that
traders cancel more orders in opaque markets regardless of the information setting, especially
in the second half of trading. In other words, cancel-to-make rate provides further evidence
that market opacity helps traders reduce exposure costs.
4.6 Competition between insiders
The results reported so far rely on a monopolistic informed trader. As a robustness
test, I run additional session with two insiders. One can argue that competition among
informed traders could lead to di¤erent market outcomes that would not arise in a market
with a single informed trader (Boulatov and George, 2013). To alleviate this concern, I
repeat the analysis in Section 4.4, analyzing the implication of opacity on market quality
under asymmetric information with two insiders.
The results in Table 9 are broadly in line with those in Table 8. One di¤erence, however,
is that increasing the degree of adverse selection results in increased book depth in opaque
markets (p-value=0.016) without much a¤ecting the spreads. This result is consistent with
the previous empirical evidence from the Toronto Stock Exchange (Anand andWeaver, 2004)
13I do not observe a signicant e¤ect on spreads in the rst trading cycle, because until the informed
traders become insiders, trading strategies vary greatly.
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and the experimental ndings of BOS (2015). Under an opaque regime, quoted spreads are
lower, on average, by half a tick (but not statistically signicantly) and, unlike markets with
a monopolistic insider, spreads are similar around public news releases across transparency
regimes. However, opacity has a signicant impact on e¤ective spreads, mainly through
the reduction of a permanent price impact. It seems that erce competition for liquidity
provision among insiders accelerates the incorporation of information into prices under an
opaque regime.
4.7 Informational e¢ ciency
An important function of e¢ cient markets is to aggregate information and reect the
true fundamental value of traded assets. Undisclosed orders could hinder value discovery if
they are predominantly used by informed traders to conceal their informed trades. However,
if all market participants opt for hidden liquidity, then the e¤ect on information e¢ ciency
will not be clear. In fact, the evidence so far is mixed (Ye, 2012; Zhu, 2014; BOS, 2015;
Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2015).
The public news announcement in the experimental design allows me to test how
information is incorporated into prices through trading under di¤erent transparency regimes.
The informational e¢ ciency of the markets is proxied by the average deviation of midquotes
from the fundamental asset value once the news is made public. The deviation is measured
as the absolute di¤erence between the midquote and the true dividend normalized by the
range of the dividend distribution.
In the presence of a monopolistic insider, midquotes converge monotonically to the true
liquidating dividend after the information event. Panel A of Figure 7 reveals that market
transparency does not a¤ect the informational e¢ ciency of the markets. The monopolistic
insider competes with other large liquidity traders and follows pooling strategies to maximize
the informational advantage. The use of undisclosed orders at lower levels of the book does
not help with the value discovery. The situation is di¤erent when there is competition among
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insiders for liquidity provision. Panel B of Figure 7 shows that value discovery is faster under
opaque markets with shared informational rents, where competition for liquidity provision
is more intense (Boulatov and George, 2013). Market opacity induces informed traders to
provide liquidity more aggressively, which leads to more informative transaction prices.14
5 Conclusion
In my experimental asset markets, traders exploit undisclosed orders to enrich their
strategy set. Undisclosed orders not only help liquidity traders reduce order exposure but
also control the price risk. Hence they complement both limit and marketable orders. In
opaque markets, liquidity traders improve execution probabilities by managing limit order
aggressiveness. Under asymmetric information, monopolistic insiders compete with large
liquidity traders for liquidity provision and, even though a subset of informed traders rely
on hidden liquidity, opaque markets help insiders trade less aggressively.
The market transparency increases the trading prots of large liquidity traders in opaque
markets under symmetric information. While a liquidity trader submits directional orders in
line with her trading target, an uninformed trader operates on both sides of the LOB. The
reduced cost of immediacy via lower spreads in opaque markets helps liquidity traders and
is detrimental for uninformed ones. On the contrary, under adverse selection, large liquidity
traders are worse o¤ from reduced transparency, especially if the information is owned by a
single insider. An insider is better at exploiting her informational advantage in an opaque
market.
My results show that the e¤ect of undisclosed orders on market quality largely depends
on informational friction. Without an insider, a reduction in transparency contributes
positively to market liquidity by reducing spreads, especially toward the end of trading.
On the other hand, under asymmetric information, the e¤ect of market opacity on liquidity
14This result regarding informational e¢ ciency di¤ers from that of BOS (2015). The di¤erence may be
due to the fact that, in my setting, insider traders know the fundamental value of the asset, as opposed to
informed traders who receive a signal about the true value, as in BOSs study (2015).
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is mostly visible around the release of public news. Increasing the degree of adverse selection
also results in increased book depth in opaque markets. Limiting pre-trade transparency
can be benecial for securities that are less exposed to private information, for example,
large rms and bonds; however, in markets with a potential for asymmetric information,
for example, higher institutional participation or small rms, undisclosed orders do not
necessarily improve market quality, except around information-sensitive periods, unless there
is erce competition among informed traders.
Finally, I show that the value discovery is also sensitive to the degree of asymmetric
information. In the case of a monopolistic insider, the market transparency does not change
the informational e¢ ciency of the markets, while value discovery is faster under opaque
markets when informational rents are shared between insiders.
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Figure 1 shows the dynamic evolution of limit, marketable, and undisclosed order submission in
shares. The data are aggregated over markets under symmetric and asymmetric information, and
I report average values per market over 30-second intervals. The vertical line indicates the time of




Panel A shows the number of undisclosed orders submitted in di¤erent time periods during trading:
rst half and second half of trading, one minute before and after the public information release.
Panel B shows the mean and median percentage of executed volume that consists of undisclosed




This gure shows the average trading prots of each trader type. The trading prot is the nal
payo¤net of the initial endowment. Panel A exhibits the trading prots in markets under symmetric
information, that is, no insider trader, and I compare prots across transparent and opaque markets.
Panel B exhibits trading prots in markets under asymmetric information, that is, with one insider,
and I compare prots across transparent and opaque markets.
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Figure 4
Aggregate trading strategies under symmetric information
In this gure, I compare the average (median) liquidity make, take, and aggressiveness in
transparent and opaque markets under symmetric information. Liquidity make is proxied by the
submission rate, that is, the sum of submitted limit orders (plus undisclosed orders in opaque
markets) over total orders. The take rate is the sum of submitted marketable orders over limit
orders (plus undisclosed orders in opaque markets). The limit order aggressiveness is the average
distance between the limit order price and the prevailing midquote at the time of order submission.
The data are aggregated over 60-second time intervals. The vertical line indicates the time of the




Aggregate trading strategies under asymmetric information
In this gure, I compare the average (median) liquidity make, take, and aggressiveness in
transparent, and opaque markets under asymmetric information. Liquidity make is proxied by
the submission rate, that is, the sum of submitted limit orders (plus undisclosed orders in opaque
markets) over total orders. The take rate is the sum of submitted marketable orders over limit
orders (plus undisclosed orders in opaque markets). The limit order aggressiveness is the average
distance between the limit order price and the prevailing midquote at the time of order submission.
The data are aggregated over 60-second time intervals. The vertical line indicates the time of the
public information release about the nal dividend distribution. The dashed (solid) line shows the




In this gure, I compare the order cancellation rates in transparent and opaque markets under
symmetric and asymmetric information. The cancel to make rate is the proportion of limit orders
(plus undisclosed orders in opaque markets) that are canceled. The bars show the cancel-to-make
rate both for the entire period, and for the period after the public information release, that is, the




This gure shows the average deviation of midquotes from the fundamental asset value after the
public information release. The deviation is the absolute di¤erence between the midquote in each
second, and true dividend normalized by the range of dividend distribution Panel A shows the
data under asymmetric information with a monopolistic insider. Panel B shows the data under




This table shows the liquidating dividend distribution of the assets traded in experimental markets.
For each market, an asset from this pool is selected. The columns 1-3 correspond to the initial
values of the dividends until the public information arrival at the third minute. The other columns
show the distribution under the good news (columns 4-6), that is, $10 increase in unconditional
expected value, and bad news (columns 7-9), that is, $10 decrease in unconditional expected value.
Initial states Good news Bad news
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asset L M H L M H L M H
1 30 41 64 40 51 74 20 31 54
2 29 41 65 39 51 75 19 31 55
3 28 41 66 38 51 76 18 31 56
4 27 41 67 37 51 77 17 31 57
5 26 41 68 36 51 78 16 31 58
6 25 41 69 35 51 79 15 31 59
7 26 49 60 36 59 70 16 39 50
8 25 49 61 35 59 71 15 39 51
9 24 49 62 34 59 72 14 39 52
10 23 49 63 33 59 73 13 39 53
11 22 49 64 32 59 74 12 39 54




This table shows the parameter choices for di¤erent trader types. The initial endowment in each
market is the sum of the cash in experimental units and shares given to each trader type. For each
trader type, the unconditional expected value of the initial endowments is the same: the initial cash
plus the number of shares times $45, that is, $7,375. Trading targets are dened per two-minute
cycles, and remain the same during the six-minute trading period. Missing a target is penalized
by subtracting $1,000 per unfullled target from the nal payo¤ at the end of each market. The
dividend distribution is common knowledge to all trader types. Informed traders know the true
state before trading starts.
Trader Type Endowments Targets Asset
Cash Share per 2 min. Penalty info
1 or 2 uninformed $4,000 75 no target no penalty distribution
1 small liquidity (buy) $5,125 50 8 shares $1,000 distribution
1 small liquidity (sell) $2,875 1000 8 shares $1,000 distribution
1 large liquidity (buy) $6,700 15 20 shares $1,000 distribution
1 large liquidity (sell) $1,300 135 20 shares $1,000 distribution
0, 1 or 2 informed $4,000 75 no target no penalty true state
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Table 3
Trading strategies under symmetric information
This table reports the di¤erences in trading strategies across trader types, that is, uninformed
with no target, small and large liquidity traders under symmetric information. Panel A and Panel
B show the results for transparent and opaque markets, respectively. The columns 1-3 show the
average shares submitted per trader using limit, marketable, and undisclosed orders. The columns
4-6 report measures of trader aggressiveness and competition in the following order: the number
of limit orders submitted inside spread, at the BBO, and the average distance of limit orders to
the prevailing midquote. The last column reports the average distance of undisclosed orders to
the prevailing midquote conditional on submission. The values in parentheses are the standard
deviations. The table also reports one-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranked results of two consecutive
rows in the same column. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
LO MO HLO Inside BBO LO Agg. HLO Agg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




















































































































Trading strategies under asymmetric information
This table reports the di¤erences in trading strategies across traders types, that is, uninformed with
no target, small and large liquidity traders, and informed trader under asymmetric information.
Panel A and Panel B show the results for transparent and opaque markets, respectively. The
columns 1-3 show the average shares submitted per trader using limit, marketable, and undisclosed
orders. The columns 4-6 report measures of trader aggressiveness and competition in the following
order: the number of limit orders submitted inside spread, at the BBO and the average distance
of limit orders to the prevailing midquote. The last column reports the average distance of
undisclosed orders to the prevailing midquote conditional on submission. The values in parentheses
are the standard deviations. The table also reports one-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranked results of
two consecutive rows in the same column. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
LO MO HLO Inside BBO LO Agg. HLO Agg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
















































































































































ANOVA results under symmetric markets
This table presents the results of an ANOVA to test the e¤ects of market structure on trading
prots under symmetric information. The dependent variable is the traders payo¤ relative
to the average market payo¤ normalized by the unconditional expected payo¤ ($7,375). The
independent variables include trader type  uninformed trader, small liquidity (buy/sell), large
liquidity (buy/sell) , opacity (transparent versus opaque), extremity (whether the state is extreme
or not), and interaction terms. An asset is classied as extreme if the liquidating dividend is more
than 20% from the unconditional mean. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Source df Sum of Squares F-statistics p-value
Trader type 4 0.019 0.92 0.454
Opacity 1 0.001 0.16 0.678
Extremity 1 0.000 0.07 0.794
Interaction (type, opacity) 4 0.052 2.48 0.043
Interaction (type, extremity) 4 0.026 1.25 0.290
Interaction (opacity, extremity) 1 0.000 0.03 0.873




ANOVA results under asymmetric markets
This table presents the results of an ANOVA to test the e¤ects of market structure on trading prots
under asymmetric information. The dependent variable is the traders payo¤ relative to the average
market payo¤normalized by the unconditional expected payo¤ ($7,375). The independent variables
include trader type  uninformed trader, small liquidity (buy/sell), large liquidity (buy/sell) and
informed traders , opacity (transparent versus opaque), extremity (whether the state is extreme
or not), and interaction terms. An asset is classied as extreme if the liquidating dividend is more
than 20% from the unconditional mean. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Source df Sum of Squares F-statistics p-value
Trader type 5 0.622 9.50 0.000
Opacity 1 0.000 0.02 0.875
Extremity 1 0.006 0.45 0.502
Interaction (type, opacity) 5 0.072 1.10 0.362
Interaction (type, extremity) 5 0.247 3.77 0.002
Interaction (opacity, extremity) 1 0.000 0.00 0.965




Pre-trade transparency under symmetric information
This table reports the mean and median values for various market quality measures under symmetric
information. I compare transparent and opaque markets using a paired sample analysis (11 cohorts)
and report one sided Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values. I compute message tra¢ c as the sum of limit,
marketable, and undislosed orders (in case of opaque markets) submitted to the LOB, the total
transacted volume in shares, and the number of shares per trade. I report quoted bid-ask spread
for the entire trading period, for each trading cycle, and each minute. Cycle 1, 2, and 3 refer to
the trading period between 1-120 secs, 121-240 secs, and 241-360 secs, respectively. The e¤ective
(realized) spread is the distance between the transaction price and the midquote (prevailing after
ve trades). The permanent price impact is the di¤erence between the midquote and the midquote
prevailing after ve trades. (Visible) BBO depth refers to the (visible) shares at the BBO, while
(visible) book depth consists of the (visible) shares at all levels of the LOB. Price (midquote)
volatility is the standard deviation of transaction prices (midquotes). *, **, and *** indicate
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Transparent Opaque
Panel A. Liquidity mean median mean median p-value
Message tra¢ c 354 287 334 274 0.449
Transacted volume 215 204 208 216 0.310
Shares per trade 1.85 1.78 2.23 1.77 0.120
Bid-ask spread 1.87 1.74 1.64 1.60 0.120
Cycle 1 2.20 1.97 1.82 1.73 0.074
1-min 2.78 2.48 2.42 2.03 0.139
2-min 1.67 1.66 1.28 1.18 0.010
Cycle 2 1.67 1.33 1.57 1.67 0.449
3-min 1.43 1.26 1.25 1.27 0.160
4-min 1.91 1.23 1.89 1.90 0.319
Cycle 3 1.65 1.47 1.57 1.37 0.483
5-min 1.53 1.48 1.76 1.32 0.319
6-min 1.81 1.33 1.38 1.20 0.005
E¤ective spread 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.48 0.260
Realized spread 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.087
Permanent price impact 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.19 0.449
Panel B. Depth mean median mean median p-value
BBO depth 20.93 19.85 24.97 20.59 0.232
Visible BBO depth 20.93 19.85 19.57 17.67 0.319
Book depth 124.53 123.73 135.98 135.36 0.120
Visible book depth 124.53 123.73 105.56 98.63 0.074
Panel C. Volatility mean median mean median p-value
Midquote volatility 4.97 4.83 4.66 4.15 0.160
Price volatility 3.00 3.12 3.01 2.40 0.500
45
Table 8
Pre-trade transparency under asymmetric information
This table reports the mean and median values for various market quality measures under
asymmetric information. I compare transparent and opaque markets using a paired sample analysis
(11 cohorts) and report one sided Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values. I compute message tra¢ c as the
sum of limit, marketable, and undisclosed orders (in case of opaque markets) submitted to the
LOB, the total transacted volume in shares, and the number of shares per trade. I report quoted
bid-ask spread for the entire trading period, for each trading cycle and each minute. Cycle 1, 2,
and 3 refer to the trading period between 1-120 secs, 121-240 secs, and 241-360 secs, respectively.
The e¤ective (realized) spread is the distance between the transaction price and the midquote
(prevailing after ve trades). The permanent price impact is the di¤erence between the midquote
and the midquote prevailing after ve trades. (Visible) BBO depth refers to (visible) )shares at
the BBO, while (visible) book depth consists of the (visible) shares at all levels of the LOB. Price
(midquote) volatility is the standard deviation of transaction prices (midquotes). *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Transparent Opaque
Panel A. Liquidity mean median mean median p-value
Message tra¢ c 336 294 334 318 0.483
Transacted volume 240 261 226 190 0.207
Shares per trade 2.16 2.01 1.93 1.78 0.087
Bid-ask spread 3.05 2.59 2.81 2.88 0.483
Cycle 1 2.93 2.16 3.57 2.48 0.183
1-min 3.56 3.21 4.09 3.48 0.139
2-min 2.36 1.86 3.13 2.27 0.207
Cycle 2 3.20 2.04 1.76 1.48 0.012
3-min 2.94 1.93 1.62 1.43 0.062
4-min 3.40 2.15 1.86 1.44 0.012
Cycle 3 3.07 2.64 3.12 2.07 0.483
5-min 3.54 2.73 2.73 2.45 0.289
6-min 2.73 1.68 3.53 1.70 0.416
E¤ective spread 1.02 0.87 0.79 0.88 0.260
Realized spread 0.67 0.60 0.48 0.70 0.449
Permanent price impact 0.34 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.382
Panel B. Depth mean median mean median p-value
BBO depth 16.69 16.22 18.82 18.71 0.289
Visible BBO depth 16.69 16.22 15.18 12.41 0.120
Book depth 132.60 120.52 149.61 152.43 0.382
Visible book depth 132.60 120.52 113.35 107.51 0.120
Panel C. Volatility mean median mean median p-value
Midquote volatility 6.60 6.78 6.84 7.07 0.350
Price volatility 4.97 5.41 4.91 4.07 0.500
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Table 9
Pre-trade transparency under asymmetric information (two insiders)
This table reports the mean and median values for various market quality measures under
asymmetric information with two insiders. I compare transparent and opaque markets using a
paired sample analysis (six cohorts) and report one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values. I compute
message tra¢ c as the sum of limit, marketable, and undisclosed orders (in case of opaque markets)
submitted to the LOB, the total transacted volume in shares, and the number of shares per trade. I
report quoted bid-ask spread for the entire trading period, for each trading cycle and each minute.
Cycle 1, 2, and 3 refer to the trading period between 1-120 secs, 121-240 secs, and 241-360 secs,
respectively. The e¤ective (realized) spread is the distance between the transaction price and the
midquote (prevailing after ve trades). The permanent price impact is the di¤erence between the
midquote and the midquote prevailing after ve trades. BBO depth refers to shares at Best Bid
O¤er (BBO), while (visible) book depth are the (visible) shares at all levels of the LOB. Price
(midquote) volatility is the standard deviation of transaction prices (midquotes). *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Transparent Opaque
Panel A. Liquidity mean median mean median p-value
Message tra¢ c 371 352 395 415 0.219
Transacted volume 230 232 223 203 0.423
Shares per trade 1.98 1.76 1.70 1.38 0.156
Bid-ask spread 2.87 2.54 2.35 2.04 0.500
Cycle 1 3.82 2.55 2.85 2.48 0.500
1-min 3.59 2.67 2.91 2.68 0.500
2-min 4.10 2.70 3.08 2.78 0.422
Cycle 2 2.73 1.83 2.00 1.86 0.219
3-min 2.52 1.94 2.03 1.69 0.344
4-min 3.06 2.31 2.16 2.19 0.281
Cycle 3 2.35 2.29 2.02 1.84 0.344
5-min 2.82 3.17 2.42 2.10 0.344
6-min 2.40 1.55 1.71 1.54 0.359
E¤ective spread 2.46 3.23 0.54 0.16 0.078
Realized spread 0.33 0.13 1.43 2.14 0.219
Permanent price impact 2.12 1.31 -0.89 -0.50 0.031
Panel B. Depth mean median mean median p-value
BBO depth 17.96 16.16 19.94 19.46 0.219
Visible BBO depth 17.96 16.16 16.26 15.59 0.281
Book depth 133.08 123.53 159.00 154.16 0.016
Visible book depth 133.08 123.53 120.28 120.92 0.281
Panel C. Volatility mean median mean median p-value
Midquote volatility 8.09 8.08 8.00 7.77 0.500
Price volatility 6.81 5.64 7.19 7.02 0.500
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Internet appendix to "pre-trade transparency and informed trading:
experimental evidence on undisclosed orders"
(For online publication)
A. Experiment instructions
Please read the instructions carefully before joining the experimental asset markets.
Make sure that you understand the trading mechanism and feel free to ask questions in case
of any doubts.
Rule 1: Please do not talk to other traders during trading. If you have any question, please
raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your trading desk.
Trading interface
To join the experimental asset markets, you will have to open an internet browser and
connect to the website announced by the experimenter. After you sign up, you will be asked
to log into the markets, and you will be connected to the jMarkets server. After everybody
has logged in, a markets interface will appear. Once the trading is closed in the market,
close your browser and the trading window. Upon experimenters request, you will have to
login with the same signup information to enter a new market.
1. Active markets
TheActive markets panel is renewed each period. In this panel, you will see a scroll-down
column. This column corresponds to a market for the security. The security name is indicated
on top. The time left in a market is indicated on the right hand side above the Active Markets
panel. At the top of the column, on the left hand side you nd your trading target, remaining
target and remaining time for the target (if you have one!). In the middle, you nd your
current holdings of the security. Your current cash holdings are given on the right hand side
above the Active Markets panel below the time remaining for trading period.
The column consists of a number of price levels at which you and others enter o¤ers to
trade. Current o¤ers to sell are indicated in red; o¤ers to buy are indicated in blue. When
pressing the Highest Buy/Lowest Sell buttons on top of a column, you will be positioned in
the best o¤er to buy (that is, the highest price at which somebody o¤ers to buy) and the
best o¤er to sell (that is, the lowest price that anybody o¤ers to sell at).
When you move your cursor to a particular price level box, you get specics about the
available o¤ers. On top, at the left hand side, youll see the number of units requested for
purchase. Each time you click on it, you send an order to buy one unit yourself. On top, at
the right hand side, the number of units o¤ered for sale is given. You send an order to sell
one unit each time you yourself click on it. At the bottom, youll see how many units you
o¤ered. (Your o¤ers are also listed under Current Orders to the right of the Active Markets
panel.)
If you click on the price level, a small window appears that allows you to o¤er multiple units
to buy or to sell.
2. Order book
Order book lists the all the orders made during the trading period that are not yet
transacted. The sell orders are listed on top of the buy orders in a descending order. In each
row, you can see the price and trade direction, that is, buy or sell, and the units.
3. History
The History panel shows a chart of past transaction prices for the security. Like the
Active Markets panel, it refreshes in every market.
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4. Transaction history
The Transaction history table shows your past transactions in the market. In each row,
you see the Price (Transaction price), standing price and units. Transaction price is the
price that is o¤ered by the buyer or the seller and the standing price is the best, that is, the
lowest (highest) sell (buy) price standing price in the order book.
5. Earning history
The Earnings history table shows, for each period, your nal holdings for the security
shares and cash, as well as the resulting market earnings (net of penalty).
Experimental asset markets
The experiment consists of a sequence of asset markets. Before entering the market,
you will be given a fresh supply of shares of a single security and cash. Once markets open
you are free to trade the shares of the security. You buy shares with cash and you get cash
if you sell shares. Do not feel compelled to trade; make sure that trading is to your best
interest!
Trader types
As a trader you might have trading targets while the market is open. Traderstarget
will be either to sell 20 shares (alternatively 8 shares) each 2 minutes or to buy 20 shares
(alternatively 8 shares) each 2 minutes. But, there are also traders in the market without
trading targets. In each market, there will be two traders without trading targets, one with
20 sell, one with 20 buy, one with 8 sell and one with 8 buy targets.
Traders will have di¤erent targets in di¤erent markets. If you have a target, it will be
stated clearly on your screen. At the end of trading, you will be assessed a penalty for each
unfullled target. This penalty is large enough that it is worth trading at any price, no
matter how unfavorable, to hit your target. The goal of a target trader is to meet his or her
goal at the most favorable prices possible. Once they hit their targets, target traders can
buy or sell as many shares as they please without penalty.
The security
At the beginning of each market, you will be given a fresh supply of shares of a security
along with cash. At the end of the periods, the security pays a liquidating dividend (per
share) that is determined by the drawing of a state. The possible states State 1, State 2 or
State 3 are equally likely. The security pays a di¤erent dividend in each state.
Information structure
All traders attending the experimental asset markets will have access to the same
information regarding the value of the security. The dividends paid in each state will be
announced to all traders at the beginning of the trading period. But, the actual state
at the end of the market will be unknown until market closes. There will be a public
information release in the middle of the trading period regarding the dividends paid by the
security. Public information will reveal either a uniform upward or uniform downward shift
of dividends in all states.
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The table below is an example of how the dividends depend on each state.
How to be the best trader?
You start each market with a number of shares and amount of cash. Your initial
endowment will be clearly stated on your trading interface.
Bankruptcy rules apply in the markets; that is, you cannot buy shares if you do not
have money to pay for them, and you cannot sell shares you do not own.
Each security and cash expires at the end of the market, which means that you do not
carry them over to the next market. At that point, the securities pay a liquidating dividend
(per share) as specied above. The dividends, together with your cash balance (net of target
penalty), constitute your market earnings.
Your aim as a trader is to maximize your end-of trading wealth. Tradersearnings in
each market is the liquidation value of the security you hold at the end of the trading in
each market, plus the capital gains (losses) obtained through trading of the asset minus the
penalty (1,000 experimental currency) for each unfullled trading target.
An example: You make money every time you buy a share for less than true value or
sell a share for more than true value. For example, buying a share worth $45 at a price of
$30 creates a gain of $15 (Experimental Units). Selling that share at that price creates a
loss of $15 (Experimental Units).
Trading mechanism and the rules
Whenever you enter an o¤er to sell at a price below or equal to that of the best available
buy order, a sale takes place. You receive the price of the buy order in cash. Whenever you
enter an o¤er to buy at a price above or equal to that of the best available sell order, a
purchase takes place. You will be charged the price of the sell order. You can cancel your
orders.
The system imposes strict price-time priority15: It means that among buy orders those
at higher prices will be executed rst, and if there are several buy orders at the same price
level, the oldest orders in the book will be executed rst. Analogously, among sell orders
those at low prices will be executed rst, and if there are several sell orders at a given price
level, the oldest ones will be executed rst.
15In practice sessions, I explained how the priority rules change under an opaque regime. See online
Appendix B for details.
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Notice that you cannot trade with yourself. If you try to take an order you entered,
your request will be rejected. You can never enter a buy at a price greater than your own
sell, or a sell at a price less than your own buy. Doing so would be like trying to trade with
yourself.
Before you send in an o¤er, jMarkets will check two things: the cash constraint, and
the bankruptcy constraint.
The cash constraint concerns whether you have enough cash to buy securities. If you
send in an o¤er to buy, you need to have enough cash.
The bankruptcy constraint concerns your ability to deliver on promises that you
implicitly make by trading securities. We may not allow you to trade to holdings that
generate losses in some state(s). A message appears if that is the case and your order will
not go through. Enjoy trading!
A.1 Trading interface16
16I thank Yomi Kastro and Vahit Hanoglu for their help with the modication of the jMarkets to
incorporate undisclosed orders.
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B. Description of an electronic limit order book (LOB)
In this section, I explain peculiar features of electronic limit order books (LOB). LOBs
are commonly used in many exchanges around the world. An electronic LOB is a centralized
automated market where agents submit buy and sell orders to a computerized system. In
this paper, I focus on order-driven markets which are based on tradersdirect interaction
as opposed to quote-driven markets where intermediaries such as specialists or dealers are
active. In these continuous double auction markets, traders supply liquidity by posting
limit orders and demand liquidity via marketable orders. A limit order species both the
quantity and the price (maximum price for limit buy or minimum price for limit sell) for
execution. Marketable orders only specify the quantity and are executed at best price
(highest bid/lowest ask) available. Marketable orders are executed immediately, but are
subject to price risk. Since the trader does not specify the price, execution at the prevailing
best price might be unfavorable. On the contrary, limit orders limit the price risk by the
specied price, but immediate execution is not guaranteed, that is, there is execution risk
associated with limit orders. Below we show a simple illustration of a LOB once several limit
orders have been posted;
Ask / Bid Price Visible depth Actual depth
A3 54.00 30 30
A2 52.00 40 40
A1 51.00 10 10
B1 49.00 20 20
B2 47.00 30 30
B3 46.00 15 15
In this illustration, I focus on the best three ask and bid prices. The tick size is $1
and in its current state the bid-ask spread is $2. The rows in bold show the current best
bid-o¤er (BBO). In transparent markets, where undisclosed orders are not available, the
visible quantity (depth) is equal to actual quantity in all price levels. In opaque markets,
traders are also allowed to specify their exposure, by stating the portion of the quantity to
they are willing to hide. In most of the markets there is a minimum quantity (peak size) for
hidden orders that cannot be hidden (a.k.a. undisclosed orders). In opaque markets, on the
other hand, the peak size is equal to zero. In these markets visible depth might be equal or
smaller than actual depth.
To give an example, assume that an undisclosed order HLOA10 of 10 shares @50.00 arrives
in the ask side at time t-2 and the peak size is 1.
Ask / Bid Price Visible depth Actual depth
A3 52.00 40 40
A2 51.00 10 10
A1 50.00 1 10
B1 49.00 20 20
B2 47.00 30 30
B3 46.00 15 15
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The best ask price A1 becomes $50.00 decreasing the bid-ask spread to $1. Since the
peak size is 1, only one share is visible at the best ask, while the actual depth is 10 shares.
The bid side of the book remains una¤ected.
I further assume that a limit order LOA10 of 10 shares @50.00 arrives in the ask side at
time t-1. The visible depth at the best ask (@50.00) increases to 11 shares while the actual
depth is 20 shares.
Ask / bid Price Visible depth Actual depth
A3 52.00 40 40
A2 51.00 10 10
A1 50.00 11 20
B1 49.00 20 20
B2 47.00 30 30
B3 46.00 15 15
LOBs are governed by order precedence rules for matching orders. In most of the
exchanges, rst price priority, that is, orders at best prices are executed rst, then visibility
priority; the visible quantity has precedence over hidden quantity and nally time priority
is applied, that is, in case of price and visibility match, orders that enter the book rst will
be executed rst. In transparent markets, only price and time priority rules apply. To see
how the precedence rules work, assume that a market bid MOB10 of 10 shares arrives at time
t. Since the visible part of HLOA10 has time priority over the LO
A
10, but the hidden part loses
visibility priority against LOA10, only the visible unit from HLO
A
10 and 9 units from LO
A
10 are
executed, decreasing the actual depth from 20 to 10 shares. Since the minimum visible unit
from the undisclosed order must be 1, another unit from HLOA10 becomes visible, and thus
the visible depth becomes two shares: one visible unit from HLOA10 and the unexecuted part
of LOA10.
Ask / bid Price Visible depth Actual depth
A3 52.00 40 40
A2 51.00 10 10
A1 50.00 2 10
B1 49.00 20 20
B2 47.00 30 30
B3 46.00 15 15
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C. Relative Tick Size
In order to address the potential impact of relative tick size on trading strategies, I
run an ANOVA to test the e¤ect of relative tick size on hidden liquidity provision under
asymmetric information. The dependent variable is the submitted undisclosed order volume.
The independent variables include trader type  uninformed, small liquidity (buy/sell), large
liquidity (buy/sell), informed and relative tick size (low, medium, high) based on the
terciles of liquidating dividend values, and the interaction term.
Table C.1. ANOVA results: relative tick size
Source df Sum of squares F-statistics p-value
Trader type 5 8,732 1.49 0.194
Relative tick size 2 1,181 0.5 0.605
Interaction (type, tick size) 10 12,462 1.07 0.391
Error 206 241,033
As the results above suggest, neither the trader type nor the relative tick size seems to
a¤ect the decision on hidden liquidity provision. Panel B in Table 4 shows that there are no
signicant di¤erences in hidden liquidity submission between large liquidity and informed
traders. Yet, being informed may still be an important dimension of this decision. Next, I
run another ANOVAwhere I replace the trader type with a binary variable of being informed.
I see that while being informed is important in hidden liquidity provision, the relative tick
size still does not a¤ect informed tradersdecisions to submit undisclosed orders.
Table C.2. ANOVA results: relative tick size
Source df Sum of squares F-statistics p-value
Informed 1 3,804 3.27 0.0718
Relative tick size 2 2,296 0.99 0.3741




Consider a liquidity trader who must buy L shares (L=8 (20) for small (large) liquidity
traders) every two-minute cycle, and incurs a xed penalty of $1,000 experimental currency
if the target is not reached. Then her expected prot, if she reaches the target by buying
the asset at p is:
E[] = L(E[tv
a]  pt);
where Et[va] is the expected value of the liquidating dividend, and t is the unobservable
private evaluation of the asset (Parlour, 1998; Buti and Rindi, 2013).17 However, if she
executes only x% <1 of the target, then her expected prot is:
E[] = xL(E[tv
a]  pt)  1; 000;
Note that not fullling the target is more protable only if:
xL(E[tv
a]  pt)  1; 000 > L(E[tva]  pt)








Given that the price grid is limited to $1-$90 and E[va]=$45, fullling the target is a
dominant strategy for small liquidity traders regardless of the private evaluation of the asset
and the portion x of the target. For large liquidity traders, on the other hand, not fullling
the target can only be a dominant strategy if they are the most eager sellers with very low
t. However, there is no a priori reason why a trader with a large buying (selling) target
should be an eager seller (buyer).18
17Buti and Rindi (2013) assume a  drawn from the uniform distribution that is symmetric around 1.
Extreme values of  indicate higher willingness to trade, while a  close to one represents lowest willingness
to trade.
18In fact there was only one trader out of 292 cases where a large seller did not fulll the target, and had
more shares than initial endowment at the end of the trading period.
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E. Auction for private information
As a direct test on the relative importance of undisclosed orders in the presence of
private information, I also run additional sessions (2009 experiment) where markets under
asymmetric information are preceded by a second-price sealed bid (Vickrey) auction for
insider information. Before markets open, participants are informed about the market
design, and each participant sends a sealed bid to the experimenter, that is, an amount in
experimental currency unit, to be the informed trader. The trader who submits the highest
bid becomes the informed trader in the next market, that is, ex-ante she knows the true
state of the world, and pays (subtracted from her/his trading account) the second highest
bid. Under such an auction mechanism traders are induced to reveal their true valuation
for private information.19 For the sake of illustration, assume that there are two traders:
t1(she) and t2(he). Suppose that t1 bids below her valuation vt1> bt1 , if t2 bids higher than
her valuation bt2> vt1 , then she will not be the insider so bidding up to her valuation vt1 will
not harm her. If her bid is higher bt2< bt1 , then she will be the insider, and again bidding
up to her valuation will not change anything since she pays bt2 . However, if bt1< bt2< vt1 ,
then by bidding lower than her valuation, she cannot be the insider whereas by bidding the
true valuation bt1=vt1 , she becomes the insider by paying bt2 . On the other hand, bidding
more than the private valuation, bt1> vt1 is never a good strategy, especially if bt1> bt2> vt1 ,
where trader 1 ends up paying higher than her valuation. Submitted auction bids measure
the relative price of private information under both transparent and opaque regimes.
My aim is to measure the relative valuation of private information without relying
on trading data. If undisclosed orders are primarily used for hiding private information,
I would expect a higher valuation for private information in opaque markets. Bids are
averaged over replications at the individual level (N=31, 2009 experiment) and we obtain two
average bids per trader for both opaque and transparent markets. I conduct a paired sample
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to see di¤erences in personal valuation under both regimes. The
average value paid for private information in opaque markets is, on average, 12 percent higher
compared to that in transparent markets, PIbidopaque = $1182 > 
PIbid
transparent = $1056; however,
this di¤erence is not statistically signicant (Wilcoxon p-value=0.231). Therefore, indirect
evidence from private information auctions fails to strongly support for information-based
arguments behind undisclosed orders.
19I implicitly assume that traders have private valuations (and know it precisely) for being the insider.
This might well not be the case. But, since I am interested in relative valuations under both opaque and




Trading prots under symmetric information
This table reports di¤erences in trading prots across traders types -uninformed traders with
no target, small and large liquidity- and transparency regimes under symmetric information
(Table F.1) and under asymmetric information (Table F.2). The trading prot is measured
as the di¤erence between the fundamental value and the purchase price for buy orders and
the di¤erence between sale price and the fundamental value for sell orders. I report both
prots during the entire trading period, and prots one minute after the public information
release. Prots are aggregated in each cohort, and the table reports the average values
across 11 cohorts. Trading prots are decomposed into make, that is, limit order (and
undisclosed orders under an opaque regime) and take, that is, marketable order, prots.
In opaque markets, the values in parenthesis indicate the average make prots obtained
through undisclosed orders. The table reports one-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranked p-values
of two consecutive rows (transparent vs. opaque) in the same column. Asterisks above
prots indicate whether the values are statistically di¤erent from 0. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Total prots 1-min after public info
Panel A. Uninformed Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:009) (0:350) (0:027) (0:021) (0:289) (0:034)
Panel B. Small liquidity Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:016) (0:035) (0:483) (0:007) (0:003) (0:074)
Panel C. Large liquidity Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:319) (0:042) (0:012) (0:037) (0:027) (0:074)
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Table F.2
Trading prots under asymmetric information
This table reports di¤erences in trading prots across traders types -uninformed with no
target, small and large liquidity traders, and informed trader- and transparency regimes
under asymmetric information. The trading prot is the di¤erence between the fundamental
value and the purchase price for buy orders and the di¤erence between sale price and the
fundamental value for sell orders. I report both prots during the entire trading period
and prots one minute after the public information release. Prots are aggregated in each
cohort, and the table reports the average values across 11 cohorts. The trading prots
are decomposed into make, that is, limit order (and undisclosed orders) and take, that is,
marketable order, prots. In opaque markets, the values in parenthesis indicate the average
make prots obtained through undisclosed orders. The table reports one-sided Wilcoxon
signed-ranked p-values of two consecutive rows (transparent vs. opaque) in the same column.
Asterisks above prots indicate whether the values are statistically di¤erent from 0. *, **,
and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Total prots 1-min after public info
Panel A. Uninformed Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:260) (0:160) (0:483) (0:087) (0:416) (0:074)
Panel B. Small Liquidity Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:483) (0:449) (0:416) (0:382) (0:103) (0:139)
Panel C. Large Liquidity Make Take Total Make Take Total








(p-value) (0:207) (0:183) (0:062) (0:183) (0:087) (0:449)
Panel D. Informed Make Take Total Make Take Total












Fill rates under symmetric information
The table below reports di¤erences in ll rates of limit (undisclosed) orders across traders
types -uninformed with no target, small and large liquidity traders-, and transparency
regimes under symmetric information. I report the disclosed ll rate (DFR), the undisclosed
ll rate (UFR) and the total ll rate (TFR). The former is the ratio of executed limit shares
over submitted limit (and undisclosed) shares. The UFR is the ratio of executed undisclosed
orders over over submitted limit (and undisclosed) shares. The TFR is the sum of the DFT
and the UFR. I report all ll rates both for the entire trading period, and one minute after
public information release. The ll rates are aggregated in each cohort, and the table reports
the average values across 11 cohorts. The table reports one-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranked
p-values of two consecutive rows (transparent vs. opaque) in the same column. Asterisks
above p-values indicate whether the di¤erence is statistically signicant. *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Whole period 1-min after public info
Panel A. Uninformed DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.448 - 0.448 0.917 - 0.917
Opaque 0.370 0.085 0.454 0.706 0.190 0.896
(p-value) (0.042) (-) (0.416) (0.138) (-) (0.278)
Panel B. Small liquidity DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.517 - 0.517 1.001 - 1.008
Opaque 0.401 0.055 0.456 0.692 0.089 0.746
(p-value) (0.016) (-) (0.139) (0.371) (-) (0.472)
Panel C. Large Liquidity DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.568 - 0.568 1.939 - 1.939
Opaque 0.458 0.105 0.563 1.530 0.224 1.801
(p-value) (0.021) (-) (0.382) (0.423) (-) (0.385)
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Table G.2
Fill rates under asymmetric information
This table reports di¤erences in ll rates of limit (undisclosed) orders across traders types
-uninformed with no target, small and large liquidity, and informed trader- and transparency
regimes under asymmetric information. I report the disclosed ll rate (DFR), the undisclosed
ll rate (UFR) and the total ll rate (TFR). The former is the ratio of executed limit shares
over submitted limit (and undisclosed) shares. The UFR is the ratio of executed undisclosed
orders over submitted limit (and undisclosed) shares. The TFR is the sum of the DFT
and the UFR. I report all ll rates both for the entire trading period, and one minute after
public information release. The ll rates are aggregated in each cohort, and the table reports
the average values across 11 cohorts. The table reports one-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranked
p-values of two consecutive rows (transparent vs. opaque) in the same column. Asterisks
above p-values indicate whether the di¤erence is statistically signicant. *, **, and ***
indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Whole period 1-min after public info
Panel A. Uninformed DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.481 - 0.481 1.496 - 1.496
Opaque 0.250 0.096 0.346 0.869 0.116 0.985
(p-value) (0.005) (-) (0.012) (0.139) (-) (0.160)
Panel B. Small liquidity DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.489 - 0.489 0.869 - 0.870
Opaque 0.410 0.067 0.477 3.240 0.147 3.387
(p-value) (0.051) (-) (0.416) (0.382) (-) (0.449)
Panel C. Large liquidity DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.582 - 0.582 1.088 - 1.088
Opaque 0.461 0.084 0.546 1.021 0.096 1.126
(p-value) (0.051) (-) (0.350) (0.053) (-) (0.348)
Panel D. Informed DFR UFR TFR DFR UFR TFR
Transparent 0.378 - 0.378 1.254 - 1.254
Opaque 0.326 0.067 0.393 0.273 0.148 0.456
(p-value) (0.160) (-) (0.350) (0.055) (-) (0.078)
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H. Informed trading and transparency regime
In Table H.1, I analyze the impact of an insider on market quality under both
transparent and opaque regimes. As in the main analysis, each cohort is an independent
data point and I average the data over di¤erent market replications in the same cohort under
the same informational setting. I conduct a two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum
test to analyze di¤erences between cohorts.
Regardless of the transparency regime, a monopolistic insider introduces an adverse
selection cost, which is visible through its signicant impact on both volatility and the
bid-ask spread (e.g., Foucault, 1999).20 The major di¤erence between the two transparency
regimes is in the rst trading cycle and right after public news release. While spreads increase
signicantly in the rst part of trading in opaque markets, there is no di¤erence in transparent
markets. The opposite happens right after news release. In line with the evidence in Table
8, this nding suggests that insiders are capable of using undisclosed orders strategically and
do not hasten to cash in their informational rent under an opaque regime. This strategic
behavior of informed traders makes opaque markets more resilient to news events.
20The positive relation between adverse selection and bidask spread has been recently challenged in the
context of multiple insiders (Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015).
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Table H.1
Informed trading and transparency regime
This table reports median values for various market quality measures under transparent and opaque
regimes. I compare markets under symmetric and asymmetric information using a two-sample test
(11 cohorts) and report one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum rank p-values. I compute
message tra¢ c as the sum of limit, marketable, and undisclosed orders (in the case of opaque
markets) submitted to the LOB, the total transacted volume in shares, and the number of shares
per trade. I report quoted bid-ask spread for the entire trading period, for each trading cycle, and
each minute. Cycles 1, 2, and 3 refer to the trading period between 1-120 secs, 121-240 secs, and
241-360 secs, respectively. The e¤ective (realized) spread is the distance between the transaction
price and the midquote (prevailing after ve trades). The permanent price impact is the di¤erence
between the midquote and the midquote prevailing after ve trades. (Visible) BBO depth refers
to (visible) shares at best bid o¤er (BBO), while (visible) book depth are the (visible) shares at
all levels of the LOB. Price (midquote) volatility is the standard deviation of transaction prices
(midquotes). *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
Transparent Opaque
Panel A. Liquidity No insider Insider p-value No insider Insider p-value
Message tra¢ c 281 294 0.409 287 318 0.448
Transacted volume 204 261 0.300 216 190 0.371
Shares per trade 1.78 2.01 0.256 1.77 1.78 0.396
Bid-ask spread 1.85 2.59 0.044 1.60 2.88 0.004
Cycle 1 1.97 2.16 0.235 1.73 2.48 0.004
1-min 2.48 3.21 0.256 2.04 3.48 0.084
2-min 1.66 1.86 0.300 1.18 2.27 0.000
Cycle 2 1.36 2.04 0.019 1.36 1.48 0.347
3-min 1.26 1.93 0.047 1.27 1.43 0.041
4-min 1.23 2.15 0.011 1.90 1.44 0.500
Cycle 3 1.47 2.64 0.013 1.37 2.07 0.033
5-min 1.48 2.73 0.003 1.32 2.45 0.057
6-min 1.33 1.68 0.079 1.20 1.70 0.028
E¤ective spread 0.57 0.87 0.197 0.48 0.88 0.095
Realized spread 0.34 0.60 0.300 0.27 0.70 0.106
Permanent price impact 0.12 0.44 0.235 0.19 0.31 0.256
Panel B. Depth No insider Insider p-value No insider Insider p-value
BBO depth 20.90 16.22 0.084 18.87 18.71 0.235
Visible BBO depth 20.90 16.22 0.084 17.41 12.41 0.179
Book depth 123.73 120.52 0.500 125.94 152.43 0.371
Visible Book depth 123.73 120.52 0.500 98.63 107.51 0.197
Panel C. Volatility No insider Insider p-value No insider Insider p-value
Midquote volatility 4.87 6.78 0.002 4.64 7.07 0.004
Price volatility 3.12 5.41 0.002 2.40 4.07 0.033
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